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Abstract	
This	 article	 focuses	 on	 the	 anomalies	 and	 contradictions	 surrounding	 the	 notion	 of	
‘international	 juvenile	 justice’,	 whether	 in	 its	 pessimistic	 (neoliberal	 penality	 and	 penal	
severity)	 or	 optimistic	 (universal	 children’s	 rights	 and	 rights	 compliance)	 incarnations.	 It	
argues	for	an	analysis	which	recognises	firstly,	the	uneven,	multi‐facetted	and	heterogeneous	
nature	of	the	processes	of	globalisation;	and	secondly,	how	the	global,	the	international,	the	
national	and	the	local	are	not	mutually	exclusive	but	continually	interact	to	re‐constitute,	re‐
make	and	challenge	each	other.		
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Introduction	
The	 gradual	 separation	 of	 systems	 of	 juvenile	 and	 youth	 justice	 from	 adult	 justice	 that	 was	
initiated	 in	many	Western	 jurisdictions	 from	the	mid‐	 to	 the	 late‐nineteenth	century	onwards	
normally	 sought	 legitimation	 in	a	 rhetoric	of	 acting	 in	 a	 child’s	 ‘best	 interests’.	The	 trajectory	
that	such	endeavour	has	followed,	however,	has	never	remained	constant,	has	consistently	been	
prey	 to	 over‐zealous	 paternalism,	 and	 has	 characteristically	 been	 subjugated	 to	 the	 ‘best	
interests’	of	adults.	What	may	have	begun	as	an	attempt	to	prevent	the	‘contamination	of	young	
minds’	 by	 separating	 children	 and	 young	 people	 from	 adult	 offenders	 in	 prisons	 has	 evolved	
into	a	 complex	of	powers	and	procedures	 that	 are	both	diverse	and	multi‐factorial.	 Typically,	
systems	 of	 youth	 justice	 are	 beset	 by	 the	 ambiguity,	 paradox	 and	 contradiction	 of	 whether	
children	and	young	people	 in	conflict	with	 the	 law	should	be	viewed	as	 ‘children	 first’	 and	 in	
need	of	help,	guidance	and	support	or	as	‘offenders	first’	and	thereby	fully	deserving	their	‘just	
desserts’.	Traditionally	this	confusion	has	played	itself	out	along	the	axis	of	‘welfare’	or	‘justice’.	
By	 the	 1990s	 the	 parameters	 of	 such	 debate	 were,	 however,	 significantly	 altered	 by	 various	
measures	of	‘adultification’	whereby	many	young	people	have	found	that	their	special	protected	
‘welfare’	 status	 (as	 in	 need	 of	 care	 and	 separate	 treatment)	 has	 been	 threatened.	 Rather,	 in	
many	 western	 jurisdictions	 it	 has	 become	 more	 common	 for	 the	 young	 to	 be	 held	 fully	
responsible	 for	 the	 consequences	 of	 any	 transgressive	 actions.	 Such	 developments	 have,	
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however,	 been	 far	 from	 universal.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 numerous	 counter	 movements	 have	
emerged	which	are	designed	to	 further	rather	than	diminish	children’s	rights.	The	restorative	
justice	 movement,	 for	 example,	 raises	 the	 possibility	 of	 less	 formal	 crime	 control	 and	 more	
informal	offender/victim	participation	and	harm	minimisation.	The	 formulation	of	 the	United	
Nations	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	in	1989	stresses	the	importance	of	incorporating	
a	rights	consciousness	into	all	juvenile	justice	systems	through,	for	example,	the	establishment	
of	 an	 age	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	 relative	 to	 developmental	 capacity;	 encouraging	
participation	 in	decision	making;	providing	access	 to	 legal	 representation;	protecting	children	
from	capital	or	degrading	punishment;	 and	ensuring	 that	 arrest,	 detention	and	 imprisonment	
are	measures	of	last	resort.	Above	all,	the	Convention	emphasises	that	the	‘best	interests’	of	all	
those	aged	under	18	should	be	a	primary	consideration.		
	
As	 a	 result,	 by	 the	 twenty‐first	 century,	 juvenile	 justice	 in	 many	 (western)	 jurisdictions	 has	
evolved	 into	a	significantly	complex	 state	of	affairs.	Many	systems	are	apparently	designed	 to	
punish	 ‘young	 offenders’	 whilst	 simultaneously,	 and	 paradoxically	 –	 in	 keeping	 with	
international	 children’s	 rights	 instruments	 –	 ensuring	 that	 their	 welfare	 is	 safeguarded	 and	
promoted	as	a	primary	objective.	Discourses	of	child	protection,	restoration,	punishment,	public	
protection,	 responsibility,	 justice,	 rehabilitation,	welfare,	 retribution,	 diversion,	 human	 rights,	
and	so	on,	intersect	and	circulate	in	a	perpetually	uneasy	motion	(Muncie	and	Goldson	2013).	
	
Global	narratives	
Two	 quite	 different	 global	 narratives	 tend	 to	 characterise	 analytical	 commentaries	 of	
international	 trends	 in	 juvenile	 justice.	 The	 first,	 and	most	 dominant,	 is	 essentially	 dystopian	
and	 pessimistic.	 It	 conceives	 a	 process	 whereby	 ‘hegemonic	 neo‐liberalism’	 has	 all	 but	
eradicated	 welfare	 protectionism	 and	 is	 steadily	 giving	 rise	 to	 diversifying	 and	 intensifying	
‘cultures	 of	 control’	 within	 which	 the	 special	 status	 of	 childhood	 is	 diminishing;	 children’s	
human	rights	are	systemically	violated;	and	the	global	population	of	child	prisoners	continues	
to	 grow.	 The	 second,	 but	 significantly	 less	 developed	 narrative,	 is	 inherently	 utopian	 and	
optimistic.	 It	 emphasises	 the	 unifying	 potential	 of	 international	 human	 rights	 standards,	
treaties,	rules	and	conventions	and	the	promise	of	progressive	juvenile	justice	reform	based	on	
‘best	interest’	principles,	‘child	friendly’	imperatives	and	‘last	resort’	rationales.		
	
Neoliberal	penality	
The	concept	of	the	‘neoliberal’	has	become	a	defining	principle	of	much	criminological	study	of	
globalisation	 and	 comparative	 criminal/juvenile	 justice.	 Neoliberal	 visions	 of	 a	 globalising	
world	 imply	 (particularly	 in	 their	 ‘strong’	 version)	 that	 ‘uncontrollable’	 economic	 forces	have	
moved	power	and	authority	away	from	nation	states	and	deposited	it	in	the	hands	of	‘external’	
multinational	capital	and	finance.	Shifts	in	political	economy,	particularly	those	associated	with	
international	 trade	 and	 capital	 mobility,	 it	 is	 argued,	 have	 severely	 constrained	 the	 range	 of	
political	 strategies	 and	 policy	 options	 that	 individual	 states	 can	 pursue	 (Bauman	 1998;	 Beck	
2006;	 McGrew	 and	 Held	 2002).	 The	 need	 to	 attract	 international	 capital	 has	 compelled	
governments	 to	 adopt	 similar	 economic,	 social,	welfare	and	 criminal	 justice	policies.	This	has	
generally	 involved	 a	 drawing	 back	 of	 commitments	 to	 social	 welfare	 and	 thereby	 likely	 to	
impact	most	on	juvenile	populations	(Muncie	2005).	Such	homogenisation,	it	is	contended,	has	
been	facilitated	through	a	fundamental	shift	in	the	relations	between	the	state	and	the	market.	
Unregulated	free	market	economics	have	become	established	as	sacrosanct	‘natural	order’.		
	
For	 Castells	 (2008:	 82),	 the	 institutions	 of	 national	 governance	 are	 ill‐equipped	 to	 deal	 with	
such	global	developments.	They	are	beset	by	crises	of	efficiency	(major	social	problems	such	as	
global	warming,	 financial	 collapse	 and	 terrorism	 are	 beyond	 nation‐state	 control),	 legitimacy	
(collapse	in	public	faith	in	national	politics),	identity	(state	citizenship	is	subordinated	to	other	
community	 and	 religious	 affiliations)	 and	 equity	 (economic	 competition	 undermines	
redistributive	 welfarism	 and	 exacerbates	 inequalities	 within	 and	 between	 populations).	
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Significantly	the	penal	realm	has	expanded	to	monitor,	control	and	punish	increasing	numbers	
in	the	population	who	have	been	rendered	‘out	of	place’	or	‘undesirable’.	Harcourt	has	argued:	
	
This	discourse	of	neoliberal	penality—born	 in	 the	eighteenth	century,	nurtured	
in	the	nineteenth	century,	and	today	in	full	fruition—facilitates	the	growth	of	the	
carceral	 sphere.	 Neoliberal	 penality	 makes	 it	 easier	 to	 resist	 government	
intervention	 in	 the	 marketplace	 and	 to	 embrace	 criminalizing	 any	 and	 all	
deviations	 from	 the	 market.	 It	 facilitates	 passing	 new	 criminal	 statutes	 and	
wielding	the	penal	sanction	more	liberally	because	that	is	where	administration	
is	necessary,	that	is	where	the	state	can	legitimately	act,	that	is	the	proper	sphere	
of	 governing.	 By	marginalizing	 and	 pushing	 punishment	 to	 the	 outskirts	 of	 the	
market,	neoliberal	penality	unleashes	the	state	on	the	carceral	sphere….The	logic	
of	 neoliberal	 penality	 facilitates	 contemporary	 punishment	 practices	 by	
encouraging	the	belief	that	the	legitimate	space	for	government	intervention	is	in	
the	 penal	 sphere—there	 and	 there	 alone.	 The	 key	 to	 understanding	 our	
contemporary	 punishment	 practices,	 then,	 turns	 on	 the	 emergence	 in	 the	
eighteenth	century	of	the	idea	of	natural	order	and	the	eventual	metamorphosis	
of	this	idea,	over	the	course	of	the	twentieth	century,	into	the	concept	of	market	
efficiency.	(Harcourt	2010:	74‐92)	
	
Wacquant	(2008,	2009)	views	such	punitiveness	not	as	a	consequence	but	as	an	integral	part	of	
the	neoliberal	 state.	His	 account	of	 the	 ‘punitive	upsurge’	notes	 six	prominent	 features	of	 the	
coming	 together	 of	 neoliberalism	 as	 a	 political	 project	 and	 the	 deployment	 of	 a	 proactive	
punitive	 penality.	 First,	 punitiveness	 is	 legitimated	 through	 a	 discourse	 of	 ‘putting	 an	 end	 to	
leniency’	by	not	only	targeting	crime	but	all	manner	of	disorders	and	nuisances	through	a	remit	
of	 zero	 tolerance.	 Second,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 proliferation	 of	 laws,	 surveillance	 strategies	 and	
technological	quick	fixes	–	from	watch	groups	and	partnerships	to	satellite	tracking	–	that	have	
significantly	extended	the	reach	of	control	agencies.	Third,	the	necessity	of	this	‘punitive	turn’	is	
everywhere	 conveyed	 by	 an	 alarmist,	 catastrophist	 discourse	 on	 ‘insecurity’	 and	 ‘perpetual	
risk’.	 Fourth,	 declining	 working‐class	 neighbourhoods	 have	 become	 perpetually	 stigmatised	
targets	for	intervention	(particularly	their	ethnic	minority,	youth	and	immigrant	populations).	
Fifth,	 any	 residual	 philosophy	 of	 ‘rehabilitation’	 has	 been	 more	 or	 less	 supplanted	 by	 a	
managerialist	approach	centred	on	the	cost‐driven	administration	of	carceral	stocks	and	flows,	
paving	the	way	for	the	privatisation	of	correctional	services.	Sixth,	the	implementation	of	these	
new	punitive	policies	has	invariably	resulted	in	an	extension	of	police	powers,	a	hardening	and	
speeding‐up	 of	 judicial	 procedures	 and,	 ultimately,	 increases	 in	 the	 prison	 population	
(Wacquant	 2008:	 10‐11).	 In	 this	 regard	 the	 epitome	 of	 contemporary	 neoliberal	 penality	 is	
widely	 assumed	 to	 be	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America	 (USA).	 Indeed	Wacquant	 (2008:	 20)	 has	
maintained	that	 the	USA	has	been	 ‘the	theoretical	and	practical	motor	 for	 the	elaboration	and	
planetary	 [emphasis	 added]	 dissemination	 of	 a	 political	 project	 that	 aims	 to	 subordinate	 all	
human	activities	to	the	tutelage	of	the	market’:		
	
The	 United	 States	 has	 become	 a	 major	 exporter	 of	 punitive	 penal	 categories,	
discourses,	and	policies:	with	the	help	of	a	transnational	network	of	pro‐market	
think	tanks,	it	spread	its	aggressive	gospel	of	‘zero‐tolerance’	policing,	the	routine	
incarceration	 of	 low‐level	 drug	 offenders,	 mandatory	 minimum	 sentences	 for	
recidivists,	and	boot	camps	for	juveniles	around	the	world	as	part	of	a	neoliberal	
policy	package,	fuelling	a	global	firestorm	in	law	and	order.	(Wacquant	2012:	x)	
	
Universal	children’s	rights	
In	some	contrast,	since	the	1980s,	global	human	rights	provisions	with	regard	to	juvenile	justice	
have	been	formulated	via	three	key	instruments.		
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First,	the	United	Nations	Standard	Minimum	Rules	 for	the	Administration	of	Juvenile	Justice	(the	
‘Beijing	 Rules’)	 were	 adopted	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	 General	 Assembly	 in	 1985.	 The	 Beijing	
Rules	 provide	 guidance	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 children’s	 human	 rights	 in	 the	 development	 of	
separate	 and	 specialist	 juvenile	 justice	 systems.	 and	 within	 a	 comprehensive	 framework	 of	
social	justice	for	all	juveniles’	(United	Nations	General	Assembly	1985).		
	
Second,	the	United	Nations	Guidelines	on	the	Prevention	of	Delinquency	(the	‘Riyadh	Guidelines’)	
were	adopted	by	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly	in	1990.	The	Guidelines	are	underpinned	
by	 diversionary	 and	 non‐punitive	 imperatives:	 ‘the	 successful	 prevention	 of	 juvenile	
delinquency	 requires	 efforts	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 entire	 society	 to	 ensure	 the	 harmonious	
development	of	adolescents’	(para.	2);	‘formal	agencies	of	social	control	should	only	be	utilised	
as	a	means	of	last	resort’	(para.	5);	and	‘no	child	or	young	person	should	be	subjected	to	harsh	
or	 degrading	 correction	 or	 punishment	 measures	 at	 home,	 in	 schools	 or	 in	 any	 other	
institutions’	(para.	54)	(United	Nations	General	Assembly	1990a).	
	
Third,	 the	 United	 Nations	 Rules	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	 Juveniles	 Deprived	 of	 their	 Liberty	 (the	
‘Havana	 Rules’)	were	 adopted	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	 General	 Assembly	 in	 1990.	 The	Havana	
Rules	 centre	 a	 number	 of	 core	 principles	 including:	 deprivation	 of	 liberty	 should	 be	 a	
disposition	of	‘last	resort’	and	used	only	‘for	the	minimum	necessary	period’	and,	in	cases	where	
children	 are	 deprived	 of	 their	 liberty,	 the	 principles,	 procedures	 and	 safeguards	 provided	 by	
international	 human	 rights	 standards,	 treaties,	 rules	 and	 conventions	must	 be	 seen	 to	 apply’	
(United	Nations	General	Assembly	1990b).	
	
These	core	provisions	were	bolstered,	in	1990,	by	the	United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Rights	
of	the	Child	(UNCRC).	The	‘Articles’	of	the	Convention	that	have	most	direct	bearing	on	juvenile	
justice	state	that:		
	
 In	 all	 actions	 concerning	 children	…	 the	 best	 interests	 of	 the	 child	 shall	 be	 a	 primary	
consideration	(Article	3);		
 State	Parties	 should	 recognise	 the	 rights	of	 the	 child	 to	 freedom	of	 association	 and	 to	
freedom	of	peaceful	assembly	(Article	15);		
 No	child	shall	be	subjected	to	arbitrary	or	unlawful	interference	with	his	or	her	privacy,	
family,	home	or	correspondence	(Article	16);		
 No	child	shall	be	subjected	to	torture	or	other	cruel,	inhuman	or	degrading	treatment	or	
punishment	(Article	37a);		
 No	 child	 shall	 be	 deprived	 of	 his	 or	 her	 liberty	 unlawfully	 or	 arbitrarily.	 The	 arrest,	
detention	or	 imprisonment	of	 a	 child	 shall	be	 in	 conformity	with	 the	 law	and	shall	be	
used	only	 as	 a	measure	 of	 last	 resort	 and	 for	 the	 shortest	 appropriate	 period	 of	 time	
(Article	37b);		
 Every	 child	 deprived	 of	 liberty	 shall	 be	 treated	 with	 humanity	 and	 respect	 for	 the	
inherent	 dignity	 of	 the	 human	 person,	 and	 in	 a	manner	which	 takes	 into	 account	 the	
needs	of	persons	of	his	or	her	age;	and	Every	child	deprived	of	liberty	shall	be	separated	
from	adults	unless	it	is	considered	in	the	child's	best	interest	not	to	do	so	(Article	37c)	
(United	Nations	General	Assembly	1989).	
	
The	United	Nations/global	human	rights	instruments	have	been	further	buttressed,	within	the	
European	 context,	 by	 a	movement	 towards	 ‘child	 friendly	 justice’	 that	 is	 being	 driven	 by	 the	
Council	of	Europe.	By	extending	the	human	rights	principles	that	inform	the	‘European	Rules	for	
Juvenile	Offenders	Subject	to	Sanctions	or	Measures’	(Council	of	Europe	2009),	the	Committee	
of	Ministers	has	more	recently	formally	adopted	specific	 ‘Guidelines	for	Child	Friendly	Justice’	
(Council	of	Europe	2010).	The	‘guidelines’	echo	the	UNCRC	in	stating	that	‘a	“child”	means	any	
person	under	the	age	of	18	years’	(Council	of	Europe	2010:	Section	II	(a))	and	they	apply	‘to	all	
ways	in	which	children	are	likely	to	be,	for	whatever	reason	and	in	whatever	capacity,	brought	
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into	 contact	 with	 …	 bodies	 and	 services	 involved	 in	 implementing	 criminal,	 civil	 or	
administrative	law’	(Council	of	Europe	2010:	Section	I	para.	2).		
	
Collectively	 the	 United	 Nations	 and	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe	 human	 rights	 standards,	 treaties,	
rules,	conventions	and	guidelines	provide	what	is	now	a	well‐established	‘unifying	framework’	
for	modelling	 juvenile	 justice	 statute,	 formulating	policy	 and	 developing	practice	 in	 all	nation	
states	to	which	they	apply	(Goldson	and	Hughes	2010).	As	such	–	at	face	value	at	least	–	it	might	
legitimately	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 same	 instruments	 provide	 the	 basis	 for	 ‘globalised’	 human	
rights‐compliant	and	‘child	friendly’	juvenile	justice.	After	all,	with	the	notable	exceptions	of	the	
USA	and	Somalia,	each	of	the	United	Nations	member	states	–	193	‘States	Parties’	in	total	–	have	
formally	 ratified	 the	 UNCRC	 and	 committed	 themselves	 to	 its	 implementation	 (Goldson	 and	
Muncie	2012).	Indeed,	the	UNCRC	is	the	most	ratified	of	all	human	rights	conventions.	Somalia	
has	yet	to	ratify	because,	until	2012,	it	did	not	have	an	internationally	recognised	government.	
The	 failure	 to	 ratify	 in	 the	 USA	 is	 in	 the	main	 the	 result	 of	 a	 long	 campaign	 by	 conservative	
parental	 rights	 groups	 to	 prevent	 its	 consideration.	 (see,	 for	 example,	 ParentalRights.org)	
(although	 one	 also	 suspects	 that	 there	 is	 a	 general	 reluctance	 in	 the	 USA	 to	 cede	 any	 of	 its	
authority	to	the	UN).	
	
In	many	respects,	the	global	narrative	of	children’s	rights	is	the	mirror	image	of	neoliberalism:	
emphasising	 state	 protection	 rather	 than	 individual	 responsibility;	 a	 reduction	 rather	 than	
expansion	of	the	penal	sphere;	and	the	promotion	of	child	dignity	rather	than	law	and	order	as	
core	state	response.	For	Tomás,	‘There	is	now	an	emergent	transnational	movement	fighting	for	
children’s	rights	–	childhood	cosmopolitanism	–	which	constitutes	a	form	of	counter‐hegemonic	
globalisation’	(Tomás	2008:	2)	
	
A	world	of	difference?	
Paradoxically,	given	their	incongruity,	both	of	these	‘global’	narratives	are	plausible	but	on	their	
own	 they	 are	 inadequate	 in	 grasping	 the	 complexities	 and	 incoherence	 of	 juvenile	 justice	
reform.	 Rather,	 juvenile	 justice	 laws,	 policies	 and	 practices	 appear	 formed,	 applied,	 and	
fragmented	through	a	complex	of	political,	socio‐economic,	cultural,	judicial,	organisational	and	
local	 filters.	 It	 is	also	 the	case	 that	 the	sovereignty	of	nation	states	continues	 to	be	vigorously	
defended	and	expressed	through	diverse	national	domestic	law	and	order	agendas.		
	
Differential	rates	of	custody	
Rates	 of	 imprisonment	 vary	 markedly	 around	 the	 world.	 Using	 data	 collected	 by	 the	
International	 Centre	 for	 Prison	 Studies	 for	 16	 industrialised	 (and	 what	 might	 be	 broadly	
considered	 ‘neoliberal’)	 nations	 in	 2011/2012,	 the	 rate	 of	 imprisonment	 per	 100,000	
population	varied	from	730	in	the	USA	to	55	in	Japan.	Comparing	such	figures	across	a	12‐year	
period	(from	the	publication	of	the	first	of	such	lists	in	1999)	suggests	a	generalised	increase	in	
this	rate	in	most	countries	but	notably	in	the	USA,	New	Zealand,	Scotland,	Australia,	Greece	and	
England	and	Wales	(Baker	and	Roberts	2005).	Reductions	are	only	notable	in	South	Africa	and	
Germany.	But	such	statistics	are	arguably	most	significant	in	revealing	national	divergence.	For	
example,	they	expose	the	USA	imprisoning	at	a	rate	10	times	that	of	Japan	and	the	Scandinavian	
countries	(see	Table	1).	Such	empirical	 ‘evidence’	seems	to	contradict	any	notion	of	neoliberal	
homogeneity	or	of	any	flattening	of	national	or	local	political	and	cultural	difference.	It	suggests	
that	punitiveness	(if	indeed	this	can	be	reliably	measured	by	incarceration	rates)	cannot	simply	
be	 reduced	 to	 the	 effect	 of	 neoliberal	 market	 economies,	 even	 though	 the	 most	 advanced	
neoliberal	society	(USA)	does	appear	the	most	punitive.	Clearly	the	effect	of	neoliberal	penality	
is	also	mediated	by	competing	penalities	and	by	specific	national	and	cultural	characteristics.	
	
The	picture	 is	made	more	complex	when	we	focus	solely	on	custodial	rates	for	under	18	year	
olds	(see	Table	2).	Data	collected	through	successive	surveys	carried	out	for	the	United	Nations	
Office	 for	Drugs	and	Crime	 records	a	 similar	diversity	 in	 rates	of	 imprisonment,	 from	0.1	per	
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100,000	under	18‐year‐olds	in	Japan	to	73.1	in	Scotland.	Over	the	five	year	period	2005‐2010,	
juvenile	 prison	 populations	 also	 appear	 to	 have	 remained	 fairly	 static	 with	 the	 exception	 of	
Greece	(26	point	increase)	and	the	Netherlands	(46	point	decrease).	It	is	difficult	to	observe	any	
generalised	international	pattern.1	
	
Table	1:	Comparing	prison	populations	(selected	countries)	
	
Country	
	
Total	2011/12	
Rate	per	100,000	
population	
Increase/	Decrease	
in	rate	since	1999	
USA	 2,266,832	 730	 +85	
South	Africa	 157,375	 310	 ‐10	
New	Zealand	 8,433	 190	 +45	
England	and	Wales	 86,708	 154	 +29	
Scotland	 8,146	 154	 +34	
Australia	 29,106	 129	 +34	
Canada	 39,099	 117	 +2	
Greece	 12,586	 111	 +54	
Italy	 66,009	 108	 +23	
France	 67,373	 102	 +12	
Netherlands	 14,488	 87	 +2	
Germany	 67,671	 83	 ‐7	
Norway	 3,602	 73	 +18	
Sweden	 6,669	 70	 +10	
Finland	 3,189	 59	 +4	
Japan	 69,876	 55	 +15	
Sources:	Derived	from	International	Centre	for	Prison	Studies	(2013);	Walmsley	(1999)		
	
Table	2:	Comparing	juvenile	prison	populations	(selected	countries)	
	
Country	
	
Total	2009/10	
Rate	per	100,000	
under	18s	
Increase/	Decrease	
in	rate	since	2005	
Scotland	 866	 73.1	 ‐	5.4	
Greece	 601	 30.3	 +	26.2	
Canada	 1898	 27.2	 ‐	1.6	
Netherlands	 696	 19.6	 ‐	46.6	
Australia	 835	 16.3	 +	3.5	
England	and	Wales	 1656	 13.2	 ‐	5.9	
USA	 9855	 13.1	 +	0.9	
Italy	 1157	 11.3	 +	2.4	
New	Zealand	 92	 8.5	 ‐	1.4	
Finland	 73	 6.7	 ‐	1.6	
France	 669	 4.9	 N/A	
Norway	 6	 0.8	 ‐	0.3	
Sweden	 8	 0.7	 +0.1	
Japan	 17	 0.1	 ‐	0.2	
Germany	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	
South	Africa	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	
Source:	Derived	from	United	Nations	Office	on	Drugs	and	Crime	(2011)	
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Cavadino	 and	Dignan	 (2006)	 have	 located	 such	 patterns	 in	 international	 penality	 in	 terms	of	
their	relation	to	differing	political	economies.	They	classified	these	as	the	‘neo‐liberal’,	(such	as	
USA,	Australia,	 South	Africa,	 England	 and	Wales),	 conservative	 corporatist	 (such	 as	Germany,	
Italy,	France	and	the	Netherlands),	social	democratic	corporatist	(such	as	Sweden,	Finland)	and	
oriental	corporatist	(such	as	Japan).	Such	typologies	clearly	suggest	that	societies	which	share	a	
broadly	 similar	 social	 and	 economic	 organisation	will	 ‘also	 tend	 to	 resemble	 one	 another	 in	
terms	of	their	penality’	(Cavadino	and	Dignan	2006:	14).	In	short,	those	dependent	on	the	free	
market	and	a	minimalist	welfare	state	(such	as	the	USA)	will	have	extreme	income	differentials,	
a	tendency	towards	social	exclusion,	and	high	rates	of	imprisonment.	Other	advanced	capitalist	
societies	which	have	preserved	 a	more	 generous	welfare	 state	 (such	 as	Norway,	 Sweden	and	
Finland)	 will	 be	more	 egalitarian	 and	 inclusionary,	 leading	 to	 relatively	 lower	 imprisonment	
rates	(see	also	Pratt	2008a,	2008b).		
	
There	 remains	 a	 clear	 danger	 of	 falling	 into	 a	 trap	 of	 assuming	 American	 neoliberal	
‘exceptionalism’	 is	 hegemonic	 and	 unchallengeable.	 Even	 within	 the	 USA,	 whilst	 overall	
incarceration	rates	far	exceed	those	known	elsewhere,	rates	in	particular	states	such	as	Maine	
and	Minnesota	are	much	closer	 to	a	European	average	 than	 in	other	states	such	as	Texas	and	
Oklahoma.	Similarly	the	National	Conference	of	State	Legislatures	(2012)	has	argued	that,	in	the	
first	decades	of	the	twenty‐first	century,	American	penal	excess	has	been	tempered	(particularly	
for	juveniles)	not	least	by	concerns	for	budgetary	restraint	and	cost	effectiveness.	They	note	a	
state	 legislative	 trend	to	realign	 fiscal	 resources	 from	state	 institutions	 toward	more	effective	
community‐based	services.	This	is	reflected	in	an	overall	decline	of	 juvenile	penal	populations	
but	even	so	this	movement	is	not	shared	by	all	USA	states	(see	Table	3).	
	
Table	3:	Youth	confinement	in	USA	states,	1997‐2010	
Increase	in	confinement	rates	 Decrease	in	confinement	rates	
	 	 USA	 ‐37%	
Idaho	 80%	 Tennessee	 ‐66%	
West	Virginia		 60%	 Connecticut	 ‐65%	
Arkansas	 20%	 Arizona	 ‐57%	
South	Dakota	 8%	 Louisiana	 ‐56%	
Nebraska	 8%	 New	Jersey	 ‐53%	
Pennsylvania	 7%	 Georgia	 ‐52%	
Source:	Derived	from	Annie	E	Casey	Foundation	(2013)	
	
Local	or	 inter‐state	differences	 in	rates	of	 juvenile	 imprisonment	are	also	evident	 in	Australia	
with	 incarceration	 rates	 varying	 from	 1.55	 per	 1000	 relevant	 population	 in	 the	 northern	
territory	to	0.12	in	Victoria	(see	Table	4).	
	
Such	data	suggests	 that	 the	parameters	of	 global	neoliberal	penality	will	 always	be	subject	 to	
local	 translation	 and/or	 resistance.	 Questions	 also	 remain	 of	 how	 far	 a	 global	 vision	 of	
neoliberal	penality	resonates	beyond	the	rich	industrialised	western	countries	of	North	America	
and	 Western	 Europe.	 Criminological	 research	 has,	 like	 many	 disciplines,	 remained	 blind	 to	
experiences	outside	the	countries	of	the	‘core’.	Newburn	(2010),	for	example,	maintains	that	the	
parameters	 of	 neoliberal	 penality	 are	 highly	 differentiated	 and	 will	 always	 be	 shaped	 and	
reworked	 through	 local	 cultures,	 histories	 and	 politics.	 There	 appears	 to	 be	 discrete	 and	
distinctive	 ways,	 for	 example,	 in	 which	 neo‐liberal	 modes	 of	 governance	 find	 expression	 in	
conservative	and	social	democratic	rationalities	and	in	authoritarian,	retributive,	human	rights	
or	 restorative	 technologies.	 The	neoliberal	 penality	 thesis,	 then,	 not	 only	 tends	 to	dismiss	 the	
continuance	and	co‐existence	of	competing	social	democratic	 forms	of	penality	(Brown	2013)	
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but	it	also	risks	imposing	a	framework	shaped	by	one	part	of	the	world	onto	others	to	which	it	
does	not	readily	apply,	either	partially	or	fully	(Lacey	2013).		
	
Table	4:	Youth	confinement	in	Australian	states,	2012	
Australian	state	 Number	of	juveniles	in	
detention	
Rate	per	1000	relevant	
population	
New	South	Wales	 350	 0.37	
Victoria	 167	 0.12	
Queensland	 153	 0.32	
Western	Australia	 192	 0.69	
Northern	Territory	 41	 1.55	
Australian	Capital	Territory	 24 0.65	
South	Australia	 76	 0.41	
Tasmania	 23	 0.33	
Source:	Derived	from	AIHW	(2013)	
	
Differential	ages	of	criminal	responsibility	
Since	 the	 early	 nineteenth	 century,	 most	 young	 offender	 legislation	 worldwide	 has	 been	
formulated	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 young	 people	 should	 be	 protected	 from	 the	 full	 weight	 of	 the	
criminal	 law.	 It	 is	 widely	 assumed	 that,	 under	 a	 certain	 age,	 young	 people	 are	 doli	 incapax	
(literally,	incapable	of	evil)	and	cannot	be	held	fully	responsible	for	their	actions.	However	the	
age	of	criminal	responsibility	differs	widely	around	the	world	(Cipriani	2009).	 In	the	USA,	 the	
minimum	set	age	is	six	(in	North	Carolina)	but	most	USA	states	have	set	no	minimum	age	at	all.	
This	 means	 that	 some	 offences	 committed	 by	 under	 18‐year‐olds	 can	 attract	 a	 mandatory	
maximum	sentence	of	life	imprisonment	without	parole.	In	2012,	the	Supreme	Court	ruled	this	
to	be	a	violation	of	 the	USA	Constitution’s	prohibition	of	 ‘cruel	and	unusual	punishment’.	The	
sentence	 was	 made	 optional,	 rather	 than	 mandatory.	 Even	 so,	 it	 is	 believed	 that	 America	
remains	 the	 only	 country	 in	 the	 world	 that	 is	 known	 to	 sentence	 children	 to	 die	 in	 prison	
without	any	hope	of	release	(Ratledge	2012).	In	this	context,	it	is	also	worth	remembering	that	
the	 death	 penalty	 for	 16‐	 and	 17‐year‐old	 offenders	 in	 the	 USA	was	 only	 abolished	 in	 2005	
(Amnesty	International	2012).		
	
In	some	Islamic	societies,	such	as	Iran,	the	age	of	criminal	responsibility	is	linked	to	the	age	of	
maturity	or	puberty	which,	according	to	Sharia	law,	is	nine	years	for	girls	and	15	years	for	boys	
(Alliance	of	Iranian	Women	2010‐2013).	Across	the	UK,	it	varies	from	eight	in	Scotland	(though	
as	from	2010	under‐12s	cannot	be	prosecuted	in	a	criminal	court)	to	10	in	England,	Wales	and	
Northern	 Ireland.	 These	 ages	 are	 the	 lowest	 in	 the	 EU	 (see	 Table	 5).	 It	 differs	 even	 more	
markedly	across	Europe	where	children	up	to	 the	age	of	14,	16	or	18	are	deemed	 to	 lack	 full	
criminal	 responsibility	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 tend	 to	 be	 dealt	 with	 in	 civil	 tribunals	 rather	 than	
criminal	courts.	In	England	and	Wales,	whilst	the	under10‐year‐olds	cannot	be	found	guilty	of	a	
criminal	offence,	for	many	years	the	law	also	presumed	that	those	under	14	years	of	age	were	
also	incapable	of	criminal	intent.	To	prosecute	this	age	group,	the	prosecution	had	to	show	that	
offenders	were	 aware	 that	 their	 actions	were	 ‘seriously	wrong’	 and	 not	merely	mischievous.	
During	the	mid	1990s,	however,	the	presumption	of	doli	incapax,	which	had	been	enshrined	in	
law	since	the	fourteenth	century,	was	abolished	on	the	basis	that	‘children	aged	between	10	and	
13	were	plainly	capable	of	differentiating	between	right	and	wrong’	(Muncie	2009:	239).	Such	a	
view	was	reiterated	in	2012	by	the	Minister	then	responsible	for	youth	justice	who	claimed	that	
‘from	the	age	of	10	children	are	able	to	recognise	what	they	are	doing	 is	wrong’	 (Blunt	2012:	
para.	7).	 This	was	 in	direct	 contradiction	 to	United	Nations	 recommendations	 –	 first	made	 in	
1995	 and	 repeated	 ever	 since	 –	 that	 the	 UK	 give	 serious	 consideration	 to	 raising	 the	 age	 of	
criminal	responsibility	and	thus	bring	the	UK	countries	in	line	with	much	of	the	rest	of	Europe.	
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Further	doubt	on	 the	 full	 responsibility	of	 children	 (defined	as	under	18‐year‐olds	by	 the	UN	
Convention	on	 the	Rights	of	 the	Child)	has	been	cast	by	neuroscience	research	(Royal	Society	
2011)	which	has	concluded	that	mature	decision	making	and	impulse	control	is	not	fully	formed	
until	 at	 least	 20	 years	 of	 age.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 possibility	 of	 raising	 the	 age	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	not	only	in	the	England	and	Wales	but	also	Australia	seems	to	be	far	from	heading	
current	political	agendas.	
	
Table	5:	Variance	in	ages	of	criminal	responsibility	(selected	countries)	
Country		 Commencement	age		
USA	 6+	(state	variance)	
Scotland	 8	(but	no	criminal	court	prosecution	before	12)	
Australia	 10	
England	and	Wales	 10	(doli	incapax	abolished	1998)	
Northern	Ireland	 10	(under	review)	
Canada	 12	(established	1984)	
Ireland	 12	(raised	from	7	in	2001)	
Netherlands	 12	
Greece	 12	
France	 13	
New	Zealand	 14	
Germany	 14	
Japan	 14	(lowered	from	16	in	2000)	
Italy	 14	
Spain	 14	(raised	from	12	in	2001)	
Denmark	 15	(lowered	to	14	in	2010)	
Finland	 15	
Norway	 15	(raised	from	14	in	1990)	
Sweden	 15	
Belgium	 18	
Source:	Derived	from	Muncie	(2009)	
	
Continual	disputes	over	 the	constitution	of	 ‘the	child’	 and	how	those	 ‘in	conflict	with	 the	 law’	
might	be	best	treated	further	reveals	not	only	international	diversity	but	also	how	the	meaning	
of	justice	is	subject	to	ongoing	revision	not	only	between	but	also	within	nation	state	territories	
(Muncie	2011a).	
	
Child	wellbeing	
An	overview	of	29	developed	countries,	drawing	on	data	for	2009/10,	indicates	that	children	in	
the	Netherlands	enjoy	the	highest	level	of	wellbeing.	The	report,	published	by	UNICEF	(2013),	
measures	 wellbeing	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 26	 indicators	 grouped	 into	 five	 dimensions:	 material	
wellbeing;	health	and	safety;	 education;,	 behaviours	and	 risks;	 and	housing	and	environment.	
Comparison	with	an	earlier	analysis	of	data	from	2001/2002	(UNICEF	2007)	shows	that	Finland	
and	 the	Netherlands	 ranked	 in	 the	 top	 three	 countries	 for	 child	wellbeing	on	both	 occasions;	
Austria,	Greece,	Hungary	the	United	Kingdom	(UK)	and	the	USA	were	all	placed	in	the	bottom	
third	of	the	table	in	both	2001/2002	and	2009/2010.	In	the	more	recent	period,	child	wellbeing	
in	Romania,	a	country	not	included	in	the	earlier	assessment,	was	ranked	lowest	(see	Table	6).2	
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Table	6:		Child	well	being	rankings	in	29	‘rich’	countries,	2010	
Order	 Country	 Child	well	being	ranking	
1	 Netherlands	 2.4	 (highest	well	being)	
2	 Norway	 4.6	 	
3	 Iceland	 5.0	 	
4	 Finland	 5.4	 	
5	 Sweden	 6.2	 	
	 	 	 	
13	 France	 12.8	 	
14	 Czech	Republic	 15.2	 	
15	 Portugal	 15.6	 	
16	 UK	 15.8	 	
17	 Canada	 16.6	 	
	 	 	 	
25	 Greece	 23.4	 	
26	 USA	 24.8	 	
27	 Lithuania	 25.2	 	
28	 Latvia	 26.4	 	
29	 Romania	 28.6	 (lowest	well	being)	
Source:	Derived	from	UNICEF	(2013)	
	
Welfare	and	inequality	
Formulations	 of	 criminal	 and	 juvenile	 justice	 continue	 to	 operate	 in	ways	 that	 are	 specific	 to	
local	conditions	and	cultural	contexts	and	reflective	of	the	goals	of	particular	policy	makers	and	
agendas.	Beckett	and	Western’s	(2001)	correlations	of	welfare	benefit	and	prison	populations	
across	the	USA	found	that	‘punitive	states’	(such	as	Texas	and	Louisiana)	had	the	lowest	welfare	
provision,	whilst	‘non‐punitive	states’	(such	as	Minnesota	and	Vermont)	had	the	most	generous.	
Similarly,	 in	 2006,	 the	 Crime	 and	 Society	 Foundation	 published	 research	 exploring	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 proportion	 of	 gross	 domestic	 product	 (GDP)	 devoted	 to	 welfare	
expenditure	 within	 18	 western	 countries,	 and	 the	 local	 rate	 of	 imprisonment	 (Downes	 and	
Hansen	2006).	The	report	concluded	that	‘welfare	aims’	have	become	increasingly	marginalised	
‘as	key	variables	in	criminal	justice	policy	and	practice’	(Downes	and	Hansen	2006:	3),	despite	
evidence	 that	a	generous	welfare	state	might	enhance	perceptions	of	 fairness,	social	 cohesion	
and	 stability.	 But	 welfare	 and	 imprisonment	 appear	 inversely	 related,	 producing	 remarkable	
diversity	rather	than	convergence.	Countries	with	higher	rates	of	welfare	investment	are	likely	
to	enjoy	lower	rates	of	custody,	and	vice	versa.	All	those	countries	–	including	the	UK	–	with	the	
highest	rates	of	imprisonment	spend	below	average	proportions	of	their	GDP	on	welfare;	those	
with	 the	 lowest	 levels	of	 incarceration	(such	as	Finland,	Sweden,	Denmark	and	Belgium	–	but	
not	Japan)	have	above	average	welfare	expenditure	(see	Table	7).	
	
Such	 diversity	 has	 also	 been	 explained	 with	 reference	 to	 income	 differentials	 and	 social	
inequality.	The	more	stratified	a	society,	the	more	likely	the	resort	to	imprisonment.	Wilkinson	
and	 Pickett	 (2007,	 2009)	 suggest	 that	 more	 unequal	 societies	 are	 ‘socially	 dysfunctional’	 in	
many	different	ways.	It	is	striking	that	a	group	of	more	egalitarian	countries	(usually	including	
Japan,	 Sweden,	 and	 Norway)	 perform	 well	 on	 a	 variety	 of	 outcomes	 (including	 resort	 to	
imprisonment),	 whilst	 more	 unequal	 countries	 (including	 the	 USA	 and	 the	 UK)	 tend	 to	 have	
poorer	outcomes	(see	Figure	1).	Tonry	(2009)	concludes	that:		
	
...	moderate	penal	policies	and	 low	 imprisonment	rates	are	associated	with	 low	
levels	 of	 income	 inequality,	 high	 levels	 of	 trust	 and	 legitimacy,	 strong	 welfare	
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states,	 professionalised	 as	 opposed	 to	 politicised	 criminal	 justice	 systems	 and	
consensual	rather	than	conflictual	political	cultures.	(Tonry	2009:	381)		
	
Table	7:	The	relationship	between	welfare	expenditure	and	prison	rates,	1998	
	
Country	
Imprisonment	rates	per	
100,000	population(15+)	
	
%	of	GDP	on	welfare	
USA	 666	 14.6	
Portugal	 146	 18.2	
New	Zealand	 144	 21.0	
UK	 124	 20.8	
Canada	 115	 18.0	
Spain	 112	 19.7	
Australia	 106	 17.8	
Germany	 95	 26.0	
France	 92	 28.8	
Luxembourg	 92	 22.1	
Italy	 86	 25.1	
Netherlands	 85	 24.5	
Switzerland	 79	 28.1	
Belgium	 77	 24.5	
Denmark	 63	 29.8	
Sweden	 60	 31.0	
Finland	 54	 26.5	
Japan	 42	 14.7	
Source:	Downes	and	Hansen	(2006:	5)	
	
	
Figure	1:	The	relationship	between	income	inequality	and	prison	rates	
Source:	The	Equality	Trust	(2013);	Wilkinson	and	Pickett	(2009)	
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There	 are	 of	 course	 exceptions	 to	 this	 rule.	 Italy’s	 relatively	 low	 rate	 of	 imprisonment	 is	
probably	due	more	 to	 the	peculiarities	of	 its	 legal	system	in	delaying	outcomes	 than	a	sign	of	
any	enduring	welfare	tolerance;	for	many	years	the	Netherlands	managed	to	combine	a	‘culture	
of	 tolerance’	 and	 a	 strong	 welfare	 state	 with	 rapidly	 expanding	 penal	 populations	 (see	
discussion	in	various	chapters	of	Nelken	(2011).	This	being	the	case,	American	‘exceptionalism’	
(particularly	 in	 the	1990s)	 is	 also	only	explicable	 in	 terms	of	 its	own	specific	 cultural	history	
and	 its	 particular	 configuration	 of	 Protestant	 fundamentalism,	 governmental	 structure	 and	
racialised	 ordering	 (Muncie	 2011b).	 More	 refined	 analysis	 suggests	 then	 that	 ‘the	 best	
explanations	for	penal	severity	or	leniency’	will	remain	‘parochially	national	and	cultural’	rather	
than	 global	 or	 economic	 (Tonry	 2001:	 518).	 The	 specificities	 of	 juvenile	 justice	 continue	 to	
remain	embedded	in	specific	geo‐political	contexts.		
	
Rights	compliance	
In	 order	 to	monitor	 the	 translation	 of	 the	 UNCRC	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 law,	 policy	 and	 practice	
within	the	national	borders	of	respective	States	Parties,	an	 international	monitoring	body	has	
been	 established.	 The	 United	 Nations	 Committee	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	 the	 Child	 comprises	 18	
democratically	 elected	 members	 drawn	 from	 the	 193	 State	 parties.	 The	 Committee	 has	 two	
principal	functions:	first,	to	issue	‘General	Comments’	in	order	to	elaborate	the	means	by	which	
the	 provisions	 and	 requirements	 of	 the	 UNCRC	 should	 be	 applied	 within	 specific	 subject‐
domains;	 second,	 to	 periodically	 investigate	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 each	 State	 Party	 is	
implementing	 the	 Convention	 –	 and	 retaining	 compliance	 with	 it	 –	 within	 its	 corpus	 of	 law,	
policy	and	practice.	On	both	counts	the	Committee	has	identified	institutionalised	obstructions	
to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 UNCRC	 in	 general	 and,	 more	 specifically,	 serious	 breaches	 and	
violations	 of	 the	human	 rights	 of	 children	within	particular	 juvenile	 justice	 systems	 (Goldson	
and	 Muncie	 2012).	 The	 ‘General	 Comment’	 in	 respect	 of	 juvenile	 justice	 (United	 Nations	
Committee	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	 the	 Child	 2007)	 concludes	 that	 implementation	 of	 the	 UNCRC	 is	
often	piecemeal	and	that	the	human	rights	obligations	of	State	Parties	frequently	appear	as	little	
more	than	afterthoughts:	
	
…	many	States	parties	still	have	a	long	way	to	go	in	achieving	full	compliance	with	
CRC,	e.g.	in	the	areas	of	procedural	rights,	the	development	and	implementation	
of	measures	for	dealing	with	children	in	conflict	with	the	law	without	resorting	to	
judicial	proceedings,	 and	 the	use	of	 deprivation	of	 liberty	only	as	 a	measure	of	
last	resort…	The	Committee	is	equally	concerned	about	the	lack	of	information	on	
the	measures	that	States	parties	have	taken	to	prevent	children	from	coming	into	
conflict	with	the	law.	This	may	be	the	result	of	a	lack	of	a	comprehensive	policy	
for	the	field	of	juvenile	justice.	This	may	also	explain	why	many	States	parties	are	
providing	only	very	limited	statistical	data	on	the	treatment	of	children	in	conflict	
with	the	law.	(United	Nations	Committee	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	2007:	para.1)	
	
Concerns	 regarding	piecemeal	 application	or,	worse	 still,	 regression	 in	 the	 implementation	of	
international	human	rights	standards	stem	–	at	least	in	part	–	 from	the	fact	that	the	UNCRC	is	
ultimately	permissive	and	breach	attracts	no	formal	sanction.	In	this	sense,	it	may	be	the	most	
ratified	of	all	international	human	rights	instruments	but	it	also	appears	to	be	the	most	violated,	
particularly	with	regard	to	juvenile	justice.	Moreover,	such	violations	occur	within	a	context	of	
relative	 impunity.	 Abramson	 (2006),	 for	 example,	 whilst	 presenting	 an	 otherwise	 positive	
assessment	 of	 the	 practical	 impact	 of	 the	 UNCRC	 in	 ‘transforming	 the	 world	 of	 children	 and	
adolescents’,	 argues	 that	 juvenile	 justice	 is	 essentially	 peripheralised	 and/or	 unduly	
disregarded,	even	to	the	point	of	being	‘unwanted’.		
	
Jurisdiction‐specific	non‐compliance	
With	 regard	 to	 the	 ‘administration	 of	 juvenile	 justice’,	 the	 United	 Nations	 Committee	 on	 the	
Rights	 of	 the	 Child	 has	 repeatedly	 reported	 violations	 of	 children’s	 human	 rights	 in	 both	
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developed	 and	 developing	 societies.	 The	 recurring	 concerns	 raised	 by	 the	 Committee	
particularly	relate	to	 issues	of	 intolerance,	over	use	of	custody,	 inhumane	treatment,	denial	of	
freedom	of	movement	and	overrepresentation	of	ethnic	minorities	(Goldson	and	Kilkelly	2013;	
Kilkelly	2008).	Indeed,	despite	having	had	over	20	years	to	move	towards	full	implementation,	
most	 states	 appear	 to	 have	 failed	 to	 integrate	 and	 embed	 the	 Convention	 within	 their	 own	
domestic	juvenile	justice	law,	policy	and	practice.3	For	example,	Muncie’s	(2008)	research	found	
that	 in	Western	Europe,	Austria,	 Finland,	 Ireland,	Germany,	Portugal,	 Switzerland	and	 the	UK	
have	 each	 been	 specifically	 criticised	 for	 failing	 to	 separate	 children	 from	 adults	 in	 custody	
and/or	 for	 facilitating	 easier	 movement	 between	 adult	 and	 juvenile	 systems	 owing	 to	
diminishing	 distinctions	 between	 the	 two	 (as	 is	 characteristic	 of	 controversial	 processes	 of	
‘juvenile	transfer’	or	‘juvenile	waiver’	that	allow	for	the	prosecution	of	children	in	adult	courts	
in	the	USA).	Similarly,	the	United	Nations	Committee	report	of	2004	(cited	in	Muncie	2008)	on	
Germany	 condemned	 the	 increasing	 number	 of	 children	 placed	 in	 detention	 –	 especially	
children	of	foreign	origin	–	including	the	custodial	detention	of	children	with	persons	up	to	the	
age	of	25	years.	The	report	on	the	Netherlands	(2004)	expressed	concern	that	custody	was	no	
longer	 being	 used	 as	 a	 last	 resort	 whereas,	 in	 its	 report	 of	 the	 same	 year	 on	 France,	 the	
Committee	expressed	concern	over	legislation	and	practice	that	tends	to	favour	repressive	over	
educational	 measures,	 increases	 in	 the	 numbers	 of	 children	 in	 prison	 and	 the	 resulting	
worsening	 of	 conditions.	 The	 Committee	 has	 long	 been	 critical	 of	 the	 low	 age	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	adopted	in	the	three	UK	 jurisdictions	and	in	Australia.	For	example,	 in	 its	 latest	
report	on	the	UK	(UN	Committee	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	2008),	the	committee	condemned:	
	
 negative	public	and	media	images	
 discrimination	against	minorities	and	asylum	seekers	
 high	levels	of	incarceration	
 proliferation	of	DNA	testing	and	retention	of	samples	(over	50,	000	samples	were	taken	
from	under	18	year	olds	in	2012)	
 gross	 invasions	of	privacy	and	age‐specific	restrictions	on	 freedom	of	movement,	such	
as	the	use	of	Mosquito	devices.	
	
The	UN	Committee’s	commentary	on	Australia	from	its	latest	report	in	2012	(UN	Committee	on	
the	Rights	of	the	Child	2012)	includes	critique	of:	
	
 low	age	of	criminal	responsibility	
 over	representation	of	Indigenous	children	
 abuses	in	custody	
 mandatory	sentencing	in	WA	
 failure	to	separate	children	from	adults	in	Queensland.	
	
Racialised	(in)justice	
The	 persistent	 recurrence	 of	 human	 rights	 violations	 –	 over	 time	 and	 across	 space	 –	 is	
compounded	 by	 a	 manifest	 racialisation	 of	 juvenile	 justice	 practice.	 Muncie	 (2008)	 reported	
that,	of	18	Western	European	jurisdictions	studied,	15	were	explicitly	exposed	to	critique	by	the	
United	Nations	Committee	 for	negatively	discriminating	against	children	 from	minority	ethnic	
communities	and	migrant	children	seeking	asylum.	The	overrepresentation	of	such	children	is	
particularly	 conspicuous	 at	 the	 polar	 ends	 of	 the	 system	 –	 arrest	 and	 penal	 detention.	 This	
especially	appears	to	be	the	case	for	the	Roma	and	traveller	communities	in	England	and	Wales,	
Finland,	France,	Germany,	Greece,	Ireland,	Italy,	Northern	Ireland,	Portugal,	Scotland,	Spain	and	
Switzerland;	 for	Moroccan	 and	 Surinamese	 children	 in	 the	 Netherlands;	 and	 for	 other	 North	
African	children	in	Belgium	and	Denmark.		
	
Trends	 across	 Europe,	 as	 elsewhere	 in	 the	world,	 appear	 to	 indicate	 that	 the	 regulation	 and	
governance	of	‘urban	marginality’	and	poverty	is	being	increasingly	prised	away	from	the	social	
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welfare	 apparatus	 and	 redefined	 as	 ‘crime	 problems’	 within	 burgeoning	 ‘penal	 states’	
(Wacquant	 2009).	Moreover,	 within	 such	 shifts,	minority	 ethnic	 communities	 and	 immigrant	
groups	 are	 bearing	 the	 brunt	 of	 a	 ‘punitive	 upsurge’.	 In	 particular,	 eight	million	 Roma	 –	 the	
largest	 minority	 ethnic	 group	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 –	 are	 widely	 reported	 as	 enduring	
systematic	discrimination,	harassment,	ghettoisation,	 forced	eviction,	expulsion	and	detention.	
By	collating	data	drawn	from	22	country‐specific	reports,	Gauci	(2009:	6)	notes:	‘most	…	reports	
identify	the	Roma	…	as	being	particularly	vulnerable	to	racism	and	discrimination	…	in	virtually	
all	 areas	 of	 life’.	 Increased	 ghettoisation	 of	 ‘foreigner’	 and	 Roma	 communities	 in	 various	
European	countries,	whether	as	a	result	of	 institutional	decisions	or	practical	realities	such	as	
chronic	 unemployment,	 is	 serving	 to	 consolidate	 structural	 exclusion	 and	 systematic	
marginalisation:	 ‘the	 creation	 of	 spatial	 segregation	 and	 socially	 excluded	 localities	 where	
communities	are	effectively	denied	access	to	basic	services	such	as	water	and	electricity’	(Gauci	
2009:	10).		
	
Of	 course,	 such	 phenomena	 are	 not	 restricted	 to	 Europe.	 Cunneen	 and	 White	 (2006)	 note	
similar	processes	of	racialised	justice	in	Australia,	for	example,	 in	particular	a	persistent	over‐
representation	 of	 Indigenous	 young	 people	 held	 in	 juvenile	 justice	 detention,	 despite	 an	
apparent	favouring	of	diversion	and	community‐based	sentences	for	other	offenders.	Research	
conducted	 for	 the	 AIHW	 (2013)	 noted	 that	 ‘on	 an	 average	 night	 in	 the	 June	 quarter	 2012,	
Indigenous	young	people	aged	10‐17	were	31	times	as	likely	as	non‐Indigenous	young	people	to	
be	in	detention,	up	from	27	times	in	the	June	quarter	2008’.		
	
In	 the	 USA,	 African‐American	 and	 Hispanic	 populations	 are	 markedly	 over‐penalised	 (Acoca	
1999;	Miller	1996).	For	example,	by	2010,	black	non‐Hispanic	males	were	 incarcerated	at	 the	
rate	of	3074	inmates	per	100,000	USA	residents	of	the	same	race	and	gender.	White	males	were	
incarcerated	at	 the	 rate	of	459	 inmates	per	100,000	USA	 residents	 (US	Department	of	 Justice	
2011).		
	
Indeed,	 some	 of	 the	 most	 punitive	 elements	 of	 juvenile	 justice	 worldwide	 appear	 to	 be	
increasingly	 reserved	 for,	 and	 applied	 to,	 children	 from	 minority	 ethnic	 and/or	 immigrant	
populations.	
	
Global	(in)justices	
Twenty	years	after	the	formulation	of	the	UNCRC,	UNICEF	(2009)	reported	that:	
	
 2.2	billion	children	live	in	the	world	
 1	billion	live	in	poverty	
 8.8	million	will	die	before	their	fifth	birthday	
 150	million	5‐14	year	olds	are	exploited	in	child	labour	
 10.1	million	have	no	access	to	primary	education	
 9	million	are	involved	in	child	slavery	
 1.2	million	children	are	trafficked	every	year.	Two	thirds	of	these	are	girls	under	the	age	
of	18	
 More	than	300,000	children	are	involved	in	warfare	as	child	soldiers	
	
In	2006,	the	United	Nations	Secretary‐General’s	‘Study	on	Violence	Against	Children’	(Pinheiro	
2006)	concluded	that:	
	
Millions	 of	 children,	 particularly	 boys,	 spend	 substantial	 periods	 of	 their	 lives	
under	 the	control	and	supervision	of	 care	authorities	or	 justice	systems,	and	 in	
institutions	 such	 as	 orphanages,	 children’s	 homes,	 care	 homes,	 police	 lock‐ups,	
prisons,	juvenile	detention	facilities	and	reform	schools	These	children	are	at	risk	
of	 violence	 from	 staff	 and	 officials	 responsible	 for	 their	 well‐being.	 Corporal	
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punishment	in	institutions	is	not	explicitly	prohibited	in	a	majority	of	countries.	
Overcrowding	and	squalid	conditions,	societal	stigmatization	and	discrimination,	
and	 poorly	 trained	 staff	 heighten	 the	 risk	 of	 violence.	 Effective	 complaints,	
monitoring	 and	 inspection	 mechanisms,	 and	 adequate	 government	 regulation	
and	 oversight	 are	 frequently	 absent.	Not	 all	 perpetrators	 are	 held	 accountable,	
creating	 a	 culture	 of	 impunity	 and	 tolerance	 of	 violence	 against	 children.	
(Pinheiro	2006:	16)	
	
The	 juxtaposition	 of	 universal	 human	 rights	 discourse	 and	 international	 recognition	 of	 state	
responsibilities	to	safeguard	children	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	pervasive	violation	of	children	
by	the	State	parties	themselves	–	particularly	those	in	conflict	with	the	law	–	on	the	other	hand	
is,	to	say	the	least,	anomalous	(Goldson	2009).	Such	anomaly	echoes	Abramson’s	(2000)	earlier	
analysis	of	 the	 implementation	of	 the	UNCRC	within	 juvenile	 justice	systems	 in	141	countries	
that	 revealed	widespread	absence	 of	 ‘sympathetic	understanding’.	He	 argued	 that	 a	 complete	
overhaul	 of	 juvenile	 justice	 is	 required	 in	 many	 countries	 where	 a	 range	 of	 violations	 are	
evident	including:	 inadequate	or	non‐existent	training	of	 judges,	police	and	prison	authorities;	
no	 (or	 limited)	 access	 to	 legal	 assistance,	 advocacy	 and/or	 representation;	 delayed	 trials;	
disproportionate	sentences;	insufficient	respect	for	the	rule	of	law;	incidence	of	police	brutality;	
and	 improper	 use	 of	 the	 juvenile	 justice	 system	 to	 address	 other	 social	 problems.	 Particular	
concerns	 centre	 around	 penal	 detention	 including:	 failure	 to	 develop	 alternatives	 to	
incarceration;	 overcrowding	 and	 poor	 conditions	 in	 custodial	 facilities;	 limited	 prospects	 of	
rehabilitation;	infrequent	contact	between	child	prisoners	and	their	families;	lack	of	separation	
between	child	and	adult	prisoners;	inhumane	treatment;	and,	at	the	extremes,	torture	(Goldson	
and	Kilkelly	2013).		
	
A	focus	on	‘local	translations’	can	also	lose	sight	of	both	the	enduring	function	of	juvenile	justice	
and	 the	 extent	 of	 international	 indifference,	 whatever	 the	 jurisdiction	 or	 locality.	 Despite	
decades	of	reform,	the	historical	role	of	juvenile	justice	to	discipline	the	disadvantaged	child	has	
remained	undisturbed.	As	Goldson	argued:	
	
Youth	 justice	systems,	however	 they	are	nuanced,	characteristically	process	 the	
children	of	the	poor.	No	matter	where	we	may	care	to	look,	the	universal	gaze	of	
youth	 justice	 systems	 is	 routinely	 fixed	 upon	 children	 and	 young	 people	 who	
endure	 the	 miseries	 of	 poverty	 and	 inequality,	 alongside	 related	 forms	 of	
disadvantage	 including	 poor	 housing,	 educational	 deficits	 and	 both	mental	 and	
physical	ill‐health.	(Goldson	2004:	28)	
	
A	persistent,	and	more	serious	problem	is	how	human	rights	might	be	equally	distributed	within	
a	world	 that	 is	profoundly	divided	and	polarised	by	social	 and	economic	 inequalities.	UNICEF	
(2010)	has	revealed	that,	even	in	rich	nations,	identifiable	groups	of	children	are	unnecessarily	
‘left	behind’,	subjected	to	poverty,	denied	access	to	‘well‐being’	and	exposed	to	inequality.	The	
UN	Committee	has	also	recently	detected	regressive	movement	in	the	form	of:	
	
 ‘The	 continuation	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 financial	 crisis	 is	 causing	 drastic	 social	 cuts,	
reduced	employment	opportunities	–	especially	for	young	people	and	women,	reduced	
health	services	for	the	most	needy,	increased	dropouts	from	school	and	reduced	social	
protection	to	children	and	families.	
 Climate	 change	 is	 increasingly	 affecting	 the	 lives	 of	 millions	 of	 children	 worldwide.	
Changes	 in	 rainfall	 patterns,	 greater	 weather	 extremes	 and	 increasing	 droughts	 and	
floods	can	have	serious	health	consequences	on	children,	including	increases	in	rates	of	
malnutrition	and	the	wider	spread	of	diseases.	
 Discrimination	and	xenophobia	are	on	the	rise.		
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 Domestic	violence	and	other	forms	of	violence,	including	State	violence,	against	children	
and	women	are	on	the	rise	in	all	regions	of	the	world.	
 A	growing	 tendency	 to	 lower	 the	age	of	 criminal	 responsibility	and	 increase	penalties	
for	 children	 found	 guilty,	 in	 a	misguided	 effort	 to	 reduce	 increasing	 public	 insecurity	
and,	as	a	result,	weakening	the	realization	of	children’s	rights’	(United	Nations	General	
Assembly	2012:	paras.	34‐38)	
	
Worldwide,	 more	 than	 1	 billion	 children	 lack	 proper	 nutrition,	 safe	 drinking	 water,	 decent	
sanitation,	 health‐care	 services,	 shelter	 and/or	 education;	 and	 every	 day,	 28,000	 children	 die	
from	 poverty‐related	 causes	 (Goldson	 and	Muncie	 2006).	 According	 to	 Save	 the	 Children	 UK	
(2007),	 children	 are	 treated	 as	 commodities	 across	 all	 continents	 in	 myriad	 ways	 including:	
child	trafficking,	child	prostitution,	bonded	child	labour,	child	slavery	and	child	soldiers.	
	
It	 is	difficult	 to	conceive	of	what	 international	 justice	 for	 juveniles	can	actually	mean	 in	 these	
contexts.	Regrettably,	too,	criminologists	have	to	date	remained	relatively	silent	on	these	global	
dimensions	of	child	and	juvenile	harm.	
	
Conclusion	
The	 two	 rather	 obvious	 conclusions	 are	 that	 not	 only	 is	 compliance	 with	 rights	 frameworks	
piecemeal	 but	 also	 the	 neoliberal	 is	 highly	 differentiated	 and	works	 alongside	 or	within	 pre‐
existing	social	democratic	forms	of	penality.	This	suggests	that	we	need	to	go	beyond	global	and	
binary	analyses.	The	precise	nature	of	any	juvenile	justice	system	is	contingent	on	a	variety	of	
factors	 –	 not	 just	 global	 and	 international,	 but	 also	 national,	 regional	 and	 local	 layers	 of	
governance	–	such	as	cultural	history;	political	commitment	to	expansionism	or	diversion;	media	
toleration	of	 children	 and	 young	 people;	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 autonomy	 afforded	 to	professional	
initiative	and	discretion.	These	issues	will	seriously	affect	any	possibility	of	whether	the	UK	or	
Australia	(or	any	other	jurisdiction)	is	actually	moving	toward	a	fully	rights	compliant	system	of	
juvenile	justice.	
	
There	is	an	ongoing	theoretical	challenge	to	articulate	the	dialectic	between	local	and	regional	
spaces	 of	 difference	 (the	 contingent	 relations)	 and	 national	 and	 international	 contexts	 (the	
determining	relations)	of	juvenile	justice	reform.	At	an	international	level,	attempts	to	adhere	to	
rights	directives	and	 to	 satisfy	 the	demands	of	a	 ‘punitive	upsurge’	 conjure	up	quite	different	
future	 scenarios.	 At	 a	 local	 level,	 devolved	 powers,	 Indigenous	 versioning,	 ‘re‐branding’	 and	
local	practice	cultures	can	also	be	expected	to	continue	to	have	a	profound	unsettling	effect	on	
all	 aspects	 of	 juvenile	 justice	 policy	 and	 practice.	 In	 many	 respects,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	
specificities	of	 juvenile	 justice	continue	to	operate	within	differing	national	 frames	of	penality	
and	in	ways	that	are	specific	to	local	conditions	and	cultural	contexts,	and	reflective	of	the	goals	
of	 particular	policy	makers	 and	political	 agendas.	All	 such	 complexities	 once	more	 reveal	 the	
limitations	 of	 ‘doing	 comparative	 research’	 through	 a	 lens	 of	 either	 divergence	 and/or	
convergence.	These	traditional	tools	fail	to	acknowledge	the	continually	shifting	and	contested	
terrain	of	contemporary	juvenile	justice.	Rather,	comparative	analysis	of	juvenile	justice	draws	
attention	 to	 a	 succession	of	 local	 encounters	of	 complicity	 and	 resistance	between	and	within	
national	systems.	Future	comparative	analysis	must	surely	continue	to	focus	on	how	the	local,	
the	 sub‐national,	 the	 national,	 the	 international	 and	 the	 global	 intersect	 differentially	 in	
particular	contexts	rather	than	assuming	that	any	has	an	a	priori	determining	effect.	
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1		 All	 such	 statistical	 data	 should	 be	 treated	with	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 caution,	 particularly	 for	 juvenile	 custodial	
populations.	It	is	clear	that	different	means	are	used	to	record	juvenile	imprisonment.	What	is	classified	as	penal	
custody	 in	 one	 country	 may	 not	 be	 in	 others	 though	 regimes	 may	 be	 similar.	 The	 existence	 of	 specialised	
detention	centres,	training	schools,	treatment	regimes,	reception	centres,	closed	care	institutions	and	so	on	may	
all	 hold	 young	people	 against	 their	will	 but	may	not	be	 automatically	 entered	 in	penal	 statistics.	 (for	 example,	
whilst	 the	 UNODC	 estimates	 the	 numbers	 of	 youth	 in	 confinement	 in	 the	 USA	 to	 be	 9800;	 the	 Annie	 E	 Casey	
Foundation	(2013)	places	the	figure	to	be	closer	to	70,000).	Not	all	countries	collect	the	same	data	on	the	same	
age	groups	and	populations.	None	seem	to	do	so	within	the	same	time	periods.	Some	do	not	collect	any	data	at	all	
(for	example,	in	this	sample	no	data	is	available	for	Germany	or	South	Africa).	
2		 A	lack	of	data	for	some	indicators	means	that	some	countries	,	including	Australia,	Japan	and	New	Zealand	are	not	
included	in	the	2013	well	being	ranking.	
3		 The	committee’s	reports	on	individual	countries	can	be	accessed	on	http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/	
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